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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In the time of wooden sailing ships and docks, the tide, currents, and available
manpower were the forces that had the most profound effect on marine transportation. 2
Today, ships, ports, and facilities are run by sophisticated computers and software systems.
These systems control, among other things, vessel engines, 3 navigation, 4 and facility
automation. 5 While many of these systems are covered by patents 6 and involve trade
secrets, 7 they remain vulnerable to cyber-attacks because of their increasingly integrated
nature. Indeed, depending on the target and level of severity, a cyber-attack could cause
serious economic 8 and environmental impacts. For example, the Exxon Valdez grounding,
which caused one of the largest oil spills in U.S. history, involved a release of 257,000
barrels of oil from a total of 1.2 million barrels that the vessel was carrying. 9 For
comparison, modern crude oil carriers can carry up to 2.2 million barrels of crude oil. 10 A
cyber-attack that successfully disrupted a crude carrier’s navigation or steering, resulting in
the vessel grounding, could cause an oil spill much more devastating than Exxon Valdez.

2
Chris Oxlade, History of Sailing Ships, Q-FILES, https://www.q-files.com/technology/ships-andboats/history-of-sailing-ships/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
3
Automation
and
Marine
Software,
ABB,
http://new.abb.com/marine/systems-andsolutions/automation-and-marinesoftware (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (ABB is an industrial technology
company that sells marine software for monitoring and automation on vessels).
4 TALK OF THE NATION: SCIENCE FRIDAY, HOW LARGE SHIPS USE NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (Nat’l Pub.
Radio Jan. 20, 2012). http://www.npr.org/2012/01/20/145525012/how-large-ships-use-navigationsystems.
5 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-14-459, MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION: DHS NEEDS TO BETTER ADDRESS PORT CYBERSECURITY 4 (2014) (“maritime
stakeholders rely on numerous types of information and communications technologies to manage the
movement of cargo throughout ports.”).
6
Cf. Press Release, ABB, ABB Again Heads List for Most Patent Applications Filed by a Swiss-based
Company
(Feb.
26,
2015),
http://www.abb.com/cawp/seitp202/67a510c11e3e4656c1257df7005309a2.aspx (last visited Feb. 3,
2017).
7 See, e.g., L-3 Comm. Westwood Corp. v. Robichaux, No. 06-279, 2008 WL 577560 (E.D. La. Feb.
29, 2008).
8 Matthew Chambers & Mindy Liu, Maritime Trade and Transportation by the Numbers, U.S. DEP’T
TRANSP.,
OF
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/by_the_numbers/maritime_trade_an
d_transportation/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (according to 2011 data, 53% of U.S. import
value and 38% of U.S. export value was by vessel, the largest share of any mode of transportation);
Lily Hay Newman, What if a Cybersecurity Attack Shut Down Our Ports?, SLATE (May 11 2015, 11:16
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/05/maritime_cybersecurity_ports_are_uns
ecured.html (last visited Nov. 11 2016) (“90 percent of the world’s goods are shipped on boats.”).
9
Oil Spill Facts: Questions and Answers About the Spill, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE
COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/%3FFA=facts.QA (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).

10

Today in Energy: September 16, 2014, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=17991 (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (very large crude
carriers are responsible for most global crude oil shipments, and carry between 1.9 million and 2.2
million barrels of crude oil).
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This significant and developing threat to the marine transportation sector has been
the subject of comparatively little regulation and guidance. While parts of the Maritime
Transportation and Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) can be read to include cyber
vulnerabilities, the Act was not originally written with this threat in mind. 11 In February
2016, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and several other influential
maritime associations released “The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships.” 12 The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) followed suit in June 2016, releasing interim
guidelines addressing cyber risk. 13 Additionally, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
released a series of volumes addressing cybersecurity for marine and offshore facilities, the
first published in February 2016. 14
Given that maritime cybersecurity is a relatively new area of emphasis, this Note
will look to develop a foundation from which to build future research and
recommendations. This Note will first provide an overview of the maritime industry and
highlight industry reliance on integrated systems. Section II will survey current United
States government regulations and approaches, including methods found in the critical
infrastructure sector. Section III will examine the recently promulgated industry guidance.
From this data, this Note will posit some basic procedural, regulatory, and legislative
suggestions to assist the maritime industry in continuing to protect its critical intellectual
property and to ensure the safety of vessels and United States ports.

11 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002) (“An Act
To amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to establish a program to ensure greater security for United
States seaports, and for other purposes.”).
12
BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, infra note 224.
13 INT’L MAR. ORG., infra note 251.
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A. The Importance of Marine Transportation
According to findings for the 2002 Maritime Transportation and Security Act, the
United States has 361 public ports. 15 Maritime ports in the U.S. handle over $1.3 trillion in
cargo annually. 16 A significant disruption of the marine transportation sector would cause
severe economic complications, especially if it impacted one of our top twenty-five ports. 17
Ports and port facilities are vulnerable to cyber-attacks because they rely on
communications and information technologies to achieve cargo movement within the
port. 18 These systems include terminal operating systems, industrial control systems,
business operations systems, and access control and monitoring systems. 19 In 2014, “a
major U.S. port facility suffered a system disruption which shut down multiple ship-toshore cranes for several hours.” 20 Protection of Maritime Critical Infrastructure 21 is crucial
for American prosperity and security. A cyber-attack at a port could have a ripple effect that
impacts other critical infrastructure sectors. 22
Marine transportation is not specifically called out as one of the sixteen critical
infrastructure sectors 23 identified in Presidential Policy Directive Twenty-One, however, it
can be considered a subset of the “Transportations Systems” sector. 24 All of the sectors rely,
to a certain degree, on the goods that make their way through U.S. ports. 25 However, the
sectors most likely to be significantly affected by a port disruption are Transportation
Systems, Critical Manufacturing, Chemical, Energy, Food and Agriculture, and
Commercial Facilities. 26

14

1 AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, infra note 264.
Maritime Transportation Security Act § 101(1) (2002).
16 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4 at 1.
17
Maritime Transportation Security Act § 101(5) (“Twenty-five United States ports account for 98
percent of all container shipments.”).
18
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4 at 4.
19 Id. at 4–5.
20
U.S.
COAST
GUARD,
CYBER
STRATEGY
17
(2015),
https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/cyber.pdf.
21 Id. at 31 (“Maritime Critical Infrastructure includes the ports, facilities, vessels, and related systems
that facilitate trade within the U.S., support national defense and homeland security objectives, and
connect the Nation to the global supply chain.”).
22 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, CONSEQUENCES TO SEAPORT OPERATIONS FROM
MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY 12-16 (March 3, 2016, 13:00 EST), https://public.intelligence.net/dnsseaport-cyber-attacks.
23 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidentialpolicy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil (the sectors are: Chemical, Commercial
Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, Defense Industrial Base, Emergency
Services, Energy, Financial Services, Food and Agriculture, Government Facilities, Healthcare and
Public Health, Information Technology, Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste, Transportation
Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems).
24
Id.
25
OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21.
26 Id.
15
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A large number of industries included in the critical manufacturing sector are
dependent “upon ‘just-in-time’ supply chains.” 27 These industries can be significantly
impacted by a disruption in port operations, leading to an interruption of the supply chain. 28
This could force companies within this sector to reduce or even halt production until port
operations are normalized or another source of supply (not involving the impacted port(s))
is found. 29
Another sector that relies on “just-in-time” supplies is the commercial facilities
sector. 30 Companies in this sector keep limited inventory on hand, thus a port disruption
could negatively impact business by disrupting the supply chain. 31 Indeed, it was projected
that the West Coast ports labor slowdown in 2014–2015 “would cost the retail industry $7
billion in 2015 . . . due to missed sales, below optimal inventory levels, and the higher price
of moving goods during the slowdown.” 32
The food and agriculture sector would also be negatively impacted by a maritime
industry disruption. 33 In 2014, sixty-five percent of agricultural imports and seventy-three
percent of exports were waterborne. 34 Temporary restrictions or closures of ports or
waterways can increase product spoilage, leading to lost sales, and cause diversion to other
transportation modes or ports, leading to higher transportation costs. 35 Additionally, a port
disruption could lead to a shortage of products that are traditionally imported, such as sugar,
coffee, and certain fruits and vegetables. 36

27

Id. at 12.
Id.
29 Id.
30 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21 at 12.
31 Id.
32 Id. (citing Courtney Reagan, West Coast Ports: Retail’s $7 Billion Problem, CNBC (Feb. 9, 2015,
12:58 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/09/west-coast-ports-retails-7-billion-problem.html; Sarah
Halzack, Why a Major Backup at West Coast Ports Could Cost the Retail Industry Billions,
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/17/whya-major-backup-at-west-coast-ports-could-cost-the-retail-industry-billions/.
33
OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 13.
34 Brian McGregor, A Reliable Waterway System is Important to Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
AGRIC.
MKTG.
SERV.
1
(Oct.
2015),
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/Importance%20of%20Waterways%2010-2014.pdf.
35
Id. at 7.
36 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 13.
28

236

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

[231: 236]

The Energy Sector still relies on foreign oil imports—in 2015, petroleum
imported from foreign countries constituted approximately twenty-four percent of
petroleum consumption in the U.S. 37 This corresponded to about 9.4 million barrels per
day. 38 In addition, the U.S. exported approximately 4.7 million barrels per day of petroleum
to other countries. 39 In 2014, fifty-five percent of all daily petroleum imports into the U.S.
were through maritime shipping. 40 A cyber-attack that disrupted crude oil imports could
cause a temporary increase in the instability of gasoline prices and potentially cause
regional shortages (depending on the length and scope of the disruption). 41 The Chemical
Sector similarly relies on imports and exports. 42 A port disruption could cause increased
prices and, if a significant disruption in the chemical supply chain occurs, production of
manufactured chemicals could be hampered. 43
Goods and products are regularly offloaded from ships and transferred to other
modes of transportation such as rail and truck. Thus, the impact to the transportation sector
would not only be an impact to maritime transport, but would likely also affect truck and
rail transport. 44 Additionally, a major port disruption could cause impacted companies to
ship their goods by air freight, possibly “caus[ing] congestion within the logistic chains of
air freight companies, leading to delays in the movement of goods.” 45 Shipping by air
freight is typically more expensive, increasing costs for the businesses and potentially
negatively impacting the economy. 46
As discussed above, the maritime industry is critical to the prosperity of the
United States. However, ships not only carry “the majority of freight arriving and departing
from the U.S.,” they move “the bulk of critical military cargoes around the globe.” 47 Thus, a
maritime disruption could present a grave risk to national security. In considering the
critical role that marine transportation plays, the vulnerabilities of the interconnected
systems that ports and vessels rely on must also be considered.

37 Frequently Asked Questions: How much oil consumed by the United States comes from foreign
countries?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=32&t=6 (last visited
Dec. 21, 2016) (“Petroleum includes crude oil and petroleum products. Petroleum products include
gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, jet fuel, chemical feedstocks, asphalt, biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel)
and other products”).
38 Frequently Asked Questions: How much petroleum does the United States import and export?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=727&t=6 (last visited Dec. 21,
2016).
39 Id.
40 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 14.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 16.
43
Id.
44 Id.
45
Id.
46
Tiffany Hsu, Air Freight Firms are Bustling Amid Bottlenecks at West Coast Ports, LA TIMES (Feb.
20, 2015, 2:19 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-air-cargo-20150221-story.html.
47 WALLISCHECK, infra note 50 at 1.

[231: 237]

B.

MARINE CYBER SECURITY

237

The Necessity of Integrated Systems in the Maritime Industry

Vessels and ports rely heavily on information systems and communications to
control security, communication, navigation, cargo movement and tracking, equipment
operation, and business operations. 48 Given the emerging Internet of Things (IoT), and the
fact that the original concept of IoT was to improve efficiency in manufacturing, 49 it is not
surprising the that the maritime industry is using similar technology. Since the typical
commercial vessel spends most of its time at sea, hardwired communications and human
couriers are not available to carry information. Thus, a ship truly is a “thing” in IoT
parlance 50—a typical ship contains hundreds of sensors and systems that can be remotely
accessed. Such industrial control systems (ICS) are truly pervasive—“[t]hey are aboard
virtually [every] ship and in the shore-side infrastructure supporting them.” 51 Many of these
systems are integrated to improve vessel or port efficiency. 52 While not all systems are
directly connected to the Internet, their inter-connected nature leaves them vulnerable. 53
Significantly, “[f]ailure of any one of these systems can produce cascading impacts in other
systems and amplify the disruption to operations.” 54
Many ICS use commercial off-the-shelf technologies that are ripe for
exploitation. 55 These systems are network-based and utilize widely available
communication protocols and standard operating systems. 56 Additionally, many of these
systems are Internet Protocol (IP) addressable. 57 This upsurge in the usage of IP addressable
devices creates significant vulnerabilities, exponentially increasing the likelihood of a
severe cyber-attack. 58

48

OFF. OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21 at 3.
Robin Kester, Note, Demystifying the Internet of Things: Industry Impact, Standardization Problems,
and Legal Considerations, 8 ELON L. REV. 205, 206 (2016).
50 See Id.
51 Eric York Wallischeck, ICS Security in Maritime Transportation,, JOHN A. VOLPE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS CENTER, 1 (2013), https://ntl.bts.gov/lib/48000/48000/48074/DOTVNTSC-MARAD-13-01.pdf.
52 OFF. OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21 at 7.
53 “Even limited connection to the Internet exposes control systems to all of the inherent vulnerabilities
of interconnected computer networks, including viruses, worms, hackers and terrorists.”
WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 12.
54 OFF. OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21 at 7.
55
WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 11.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 12.
58 Id. at 9.
49
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C. The Gravity of the Cyber Threat
In 2013, a research team from the University of Texas at Austin successfully used
a GPS spoofing device to gain control of a ship’s navigation system and subtly shift an $80
million yacht off its course. 59 The yacht was tricked onto a parallel course that was several
hundred meters from its intended one. 60 While the Texas team was conducting the
experiment in international waters, 30 miles offshore of Italy, an attack that shifted a vessel
several hundred meters off course when it was closer to land or near navigation hazards
could have serious consequences. 61 Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident.
Researchers have discovered potential vulnerabilities in all transportation modes (including
maritime), involving a broad range of technologies. 62
While the highly publicized Stuxnet attack in 2010 was not directed at the
maritime industry, “it is important to recognize that the same techniques used in that
incident could be used to disable comparable systems used worldwide . . . including the safe
and reliable movement of cargo and passengers.” 63 Thankfully, the marine transportation
system has not suffered a significant cyber-attack. However, major disruptions to port
operations can cause wide-ranging impacts to the American economy. 64 Commentators
have stated that a “broad-based cyber-attack” on the marine transportation system that
slowed or halted movement of cargo, could have significant economic impact. 65 “While a
cyber-attack that disables a vessel transiting the Panama Canal may only affect a single
waterway, it can have significant economic impact around the globe.” 66 Thus, the
significant threat presented by cyber-terrorism should not be ignored.

59 Univ. of Tex. at Austin News, UT Austin Researchers Successfully Spoof an $80 million Yacht at Sea
(July 29, 2013), http://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers-successfully-spoof-an-80million-yacht-at-sea.
60 Id.
61
Id.
62 WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 2.
63
Id. at 14.
64
See supra Section I. A.
65
WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 2.
66 Id.
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II. CURRENT GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS AND APPROACHES
Cybersecurity is a topic that has gained significant awareness in the public
consciousness. 67 Cyber-attacks are becoming more prominent and egregious in nature. 68
Much of the publicity has related to data breaches at major retailers 69 and banks, 70 but the
maritime industry has occasionally gained the spotlight. 71 However, “the American public
is generally unaware of . . . the impact that [Maritime Transportation System] disruptions
pose to national security and economic stability. To most Americans, ships are floating
hotels that travel to exotic ports . . . .” 72 This makes the risks to maritime transportation
“often invisible” to the public. 73
The United States government has continued to increase its focus on
cybersecurity. President Obama recognized that “[c]yber incidents are a fact of
contemporary life, and significant cyber incidents are occurring with increasing frequency,
implicating public and private infrastructure located in the United States and abroad.” 74
Current cybersecurity regulations and laws are piecemeal but are continuing to evolve. 75
A. Marine Transportation
The principal laws that cover maritime security are the Maritime Transportation
Security Act and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act.

67

CHARLES BEARD ET AL, US CYBERSECURITY: PROGRESS STALLED, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE 2015
US STATE OF CYBERCRIME SURVEY 4 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-iteffectiveness/publications/us-cybercrime-survey-2015.html (suggesting that “the term ‘data breach’
[has] become part of the broader public vernacular . . . .”).
68 Id.
69 Michael Kassner, Anatomy of the Target Data Breach: Missed opportunities and lessons learned,
ZDNET (Feb. 2, 2015, 8:29 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/anatomy-of-the-target-data-breachmissed-opportunities-and-lessons-learned/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
70 Portia Crowe, JPMorgan Fell Victim to the Largest Theft of Customer Data from a Financial
Institution in US History, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2015, 10:12 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-hacked-bank-breach-2015-11 (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
71 See Univ. of Tex. at Austin News, supra note 58.
72 WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 2.
73 Id.
74
THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-41, UNITED STATES CYBER INCIDENT
COORDINATION (July 26, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/26/presidentialpolicy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident.
75
Chris Laughlin, Student Note, Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: A Proactive
Approach to Ensure Inevitable Laws and Regulations are Effective, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 345, 351
(2016).
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1. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was enacted in November
2002. 76 MTSA implements requirements for increased security in United States waterways,
coastal areas, and ports. 77 The Act does not specifically address cybersecurity; however, it
does require the development of Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans, Vessel Security
Plans, and Facility Security Plans. 78 These plans are designed to help ports, facilities, and
vessels to prepare for and deter transportation security incidents. 79
The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was
enacted in October 2006. 80 The Act is designed “[t]o improve maritime and cargo security
through enhanced layered defenses . . . .” 81 The SAFE Port Act amended some MTSA
provisions and also introduced new initiatives and programs. The latter included
establishing a port security exercise program and directing the development of a strategic
plan to enhance the security of the international supply chain. 82
One critical aspect of MTSA was that it prompted the establishment of AMS
Committees. 83 These committees have several key responsibilities, including identifying
“critical port infrastructure and operations,” identifying risks, and determining “mitigation
strategies and implementation methods.” 84 In addition, the committees are responsible for
developing processes to continually evaluate security and assist in developing AMS Plans. 85
AMS Plans are based on the AMS Assessments that were directed by MTSA. 86

76

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
Id.
78 46 U.S.C.A. § 70103 (2010).
79 Id.; 46 U.S.C.A. § 70101(6) (2006) (“The term ‘transportation security incident’ means a security
incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption,
or economic disruption in a particular area.”).
80 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
81 Id.
82 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 912, 941 (2016).
83 33 C.F.R. §§ 103.300, 103.305(a) (2016). “An AMS Committee will be composed of not less than
seven members . . . who may be selected from—(1) The Federal, Territorial, or Tribal government; (2)
The State government and political subdivisions thereof; (3) Local public safety, crisis management
and emergency response agencies; (4) Law enforcement and security organizations; (5) Maritime
industry, including labor; (6) Other port stakeholders having a special competence in maritime security;
and (7) Port stakeholders affected by security practices and policies.” Id. § 103.305(a).
84
Id. § 103.310(a).
85 Id. §103.310(a)(4).
86
46 U.S.C.A. § 70102(b) (2016) (stating that “the Secretary shall conduct a detailed vulnerability
assessment of the facilities and vessels that may be involved in a transportation security incident.”).
These assessments shall be updated “at least every 5 years.” Id. § 70102(b)(3). See also 33 C.F.R. §§
103.400, 103.500.
77
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AMS Assessments must: (1) identify critical port infrastructure and operations;
(2) include a threat assessment identifying and evaluating potential threats; (3) include an
assessment of consequences and vulnerabilities; and (4) make a security measures
determination. 87 In meeting the specified elements, the assessment is to consider a number
of variables including, but not limited to, physical security, security capabilities and
resources, and “[r]adio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and
networks.” 88 While the latter does not directly reference cybersecurity, it can be used to
read the inclusion of cyber threats into MTSA. Furthermore, both Vessel Security Plans and
Facility Security Plans required under MTSA must include information relating to
communications and security systems. 89 Security plans must be updated every five years. 90
A June 2014 report on maritime critical infrastructure by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found that area maritime and facility security plans contained
limited cybersecurity coverage. 91 The GAO attributed the limited coverage to the fact that
the 2012 National Maritime Strategic Risk assessment developed by the Coast Guard did
not address cyber risks in the maritime environment. 92 In testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director of
Information Security Issues for the GAO, noted that while the 2014 National Maritime
Strategic Risk Assessment did identify cyber as a threat vector, it did not “fully address[]
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of cyber incidents . . . .” 93 Director Wilshusen
concluded that until this threat is more fully addressed, the “ability to appropriately plan
and allocate resources for protecting maritime-related critical infrastructure” will be
hindered. 94 The National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment is conducted biennially, 95
with the next due in 2016.

87

33 C.F.R. § 103.405(a).
Id. § 103.405(b)(5).
89 See id. §§ 104.405, 105.405.
90 46 U.S.C.A. § 70103(c)(3)(G) (2016).
91 Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity, supra
note 4, at 16.
92 Id. (the 2012 assessment was the most current available at the time of the report).
93
DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Address Port Cybersecurity: Hearing on Maritime Critical
Infrastructure Protection Before the H. Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security, H. Comm. on
Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 7 (2015) (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Dir., Info. Security
Issues, Gov’t Accountability Off.).
94
Id.
95 Id. at 6.
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2. Port Security Grant Program
MTSA also introduced the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) 96 to help ports
with funding for the security requirements it mandated. 97 The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) administers the program and consults with the U.S. Coast
Guard, among others, to make award decisions. 98 The grant program was designed to
allocate funds based on risk. 99
The fiscal year (FY) 2014 PSGP Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA)
allowed applicants to request funding for cybersecurity vulnerability assessments. 100
Vulnerability assessments had not been something typically funded under PSGP; however,
the FOA noted that “considering the relative newness of Cybersecurity as a priority within
the program and the need to develop and enhance the voluntary Cybersecurity Framework,
vulnerability assessments may be funded as contracted costs.” 101 The FY 2014 PSGP also
stated that cybersecurity was one of the funding focus areas. 102 FY 2014 was only the
second year that cyber was considered a major funding priority. 103 Cybersecurity remained
an identified funding priority in 2015 and 2016. 104

96

46 U.S.C.A. § 70107 (2016).
Commander Joseph Kramek, The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber
Vulnerabilities, CTR. FOR 21ST CENTURY SEC. AND INTELLIGENCE 9 (July 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03-cyber-port-security-kramek.pdf.
98
Id.
99
46 U.S.C.A. § 70107(a) (2016) (“In administering the grant program, the Secretary shall take into
account national economic, energy, and strategic defense concerns based upon the most current risk
assessments available.”).
100 Funding Opportunity Announcement: FY 2014 Port Security Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY
MGMT.
AGENCY
38
(2014),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/13966237426309e497a99bef3e3c0265bbf84993b5e69/FY_2014_PSGP_FOA_Final_Revised.pdf.
101 Id.
102 FY 2014 Port Security Grant Program Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY 2 (2014),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/140630085712909e62587b8f79e748c585e37cdba09a9/PSGP_Fact%20Sheet_Final.pdf.
103 Looking back as far as 2005, 2013 was the first year that cyber was specifically called out as a major
funding priority. See generally Port Security Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/port-security-grant-program (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (wherein FY 2005 data
is the earliest available on the FEMA PSGP website).
104
FY 2015 Port Security Grant Program Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY 2 (2015),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14380216855669cf51877eec3f17c6495b672334eb050/FY_2015_PSGP_Fact_Sheet_Allocations.pdf; FY 2016 Port
Security Grant Program Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 2 (2016),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1467237017233ba181560021a43339f4c3e0253212671/FY_2016_PSGP_Fact_Sheet_Final.pdf.
97
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However, while cybersecurity was identified as a funding priority in 2014, the
national review panel for grants did not reach out to any cyber subject matter experts to
assist it in making decisions about which cyber-related grants were most worthy of
funding. 105 For the 2015 grants, FEMA did report that “they have consulted with the Coast
Guard’s Cyber Command on high-dollar-value cyber projects and that Cyber Command
officials sat on the review panel for one day to review several other cyber projects.” 106
However, FEMA provided no formal written guidelines to ensure that grant reviewers
consulted appropriate cyber expertise in either the field (captain of the port) level or
national level review process. 107 The FY 2016 Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) did
contain a more detailed discussion of cybersecurity than previous years, however, it still did
not require that grant reviewers consult cyber professionals when reviewing cyber
projects. 108
B. Critical Infrastructure
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) lays the foundation for
private sector and government entities in the critical infrastructure community to work
together to ensure critical infrastructure safety and resilience through proper risk
management practices. 109 NIPP advocates an approach through public-private partnership,
ensuring that all stakeholders in the critical infrastructure community are represented. 110
The 2013 NIPP update is consistent with Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” 111 and Presidential Policy Directive 21, “Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience.” 112

105

DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Address Port Cybersecurity, supra note 92, at 9.
Id.
107 Id.
108 Notice of Funding Opportunity: FY 2016 Port Security Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY
40
(2016),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/145557387523607ce03a778118ecc2ead8e1aae84185e/FY_2016_PSGP_NOFO_FINAL.pdf.
109 NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. 1–2 (2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NationalInfrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-508.pdf.
110
Id. at 3.
111
Exec. Order No. 13,636, infra note 112.
112
NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 108;
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, supra note 22.
106
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Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive 21

In February 2013, President Obama signed Executive Order 13636, “Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.” 113 This order recognized that “[t]he cyber threat to
critical infrastructure . . . represents one of the most serious national security challenges we
must confront.” 114 It defined critical infrastructure broadly: “systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 115 Arguably
maritime critical infrastructure is covered under this definition.
Executive Order 13636 stated that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to
enhance the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a
cyber environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while
promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties.” 116 The
Order promoted partnership between the government and the private sector, and sought to
create an information sharing program that allowed for more timely sharing of information
between the government and the private sector. 117 In addition, the Order directed all
agencies to ensure that civil liberties and privacy protections were considered and
incorporated into any cyber-related activities. 118
On the same day that Executive Order 13636 was issued, President Obama also
published Presidential Policy Directive Twenty-One (PPD-21), “Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience.” 119 The sixteen critical infrastructure sectors recognized by PPD21 were each assigned a Federal Sector Specific Agency to lead the federal efforts. 120 PPD21 focused on both the cyber and physical sides of critical infrastructure, and recognized the
interconnected nature of infrastructure systems. 121

113

Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
Id. § 1.
115 Id. § 2.
116 Id. § 1.
117 Id. § 4.
118
Id. § 5.
119 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 22.
120
Id. (“The term ‘Sector-Specific Agency’ (SSA) means the Federal department or agency designated
under this directive to be responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise . .
. .”).
121 Id.
114
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PPD-21 set three strategic imperatives to shape the Federal government
approach. 122 The first imperative directs implementation of a “national unity of effort,”
designed to increase situational awareness and clarify relationships between public and
private stakeholders. 123 The second imperative focuses on ensuring efficient information
exchange, both within the government and with the operators and owners of critical
infrastructure. 124 Like Executive Order 13636, PPD-21 stresses that information sharing
“must be done while respecting privacy and civil liberties.” 125 The final strategic imperative
focuses on an “integration and analysis function,” and seeks to use this function to inform
both planning and operational decision making. 126
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity
Framework
Executive Order 13636 also directed the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) “to lead the development of a framework to reduce cyber risks to
critical infrastructure.” 127 The order directed that “[t]he Cybersecurity Framework shall
include a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes that align policy,
business, and technological approaches to address cyber risks.” 128
The NIST Framework was promulgated on February 12, 2014, one year to the
day after Executive Order 13636. 129 The Framework was collaboratively developed by both
governmental and private sector entities and identified “a set of industry standards and best
practices . . . .” 130 Use of the Framework is voluntary and it is designed to complement,
rather than replace, existing processes and programs. 131 The Framework is broken down
into “three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Implementation Tiers, and the
Framework Profiles.” 132

122

Id.
Id.
124 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 22. “(2) Enable effective information
exchange by identifying baseline data and systems requirements for the Federal Government;…”
125 Id. see also, Exec. Order No. 13636, supra note 112 at § 5(a).
126 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, supra note 22. NOTE: maybe use quote, “(3) Implement an
integration and analysis function to inform planning and operations decisions regarding critical
infrastructure.”
127 Exec. Order No. 13636, supra note 112, at § 7(a).
128 Id.
129 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY
(2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework021214.pdf (last visited April 20, 2017).
130
Id. at 1.
131
Id. at 4.
132 Id.
123
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The Framework Core is based on five functions that are concurrent and should be
continuously considered. 133 The functions are “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, [and]
Recover,” 134 and are designed to represent a strategic, birds-eye (“high-level”) view of
cybersecurity risk. 135 The functions are further broken down into categories (functional
groups) 136 and subcategories 137 (specific outcomes). In addition, informative references are
given for each subcategory, capturing common practices used to achieve desired
outcomes. 138
The Framework Implementation Tiers are designed to reflect the level at which an
entities’ cybersecurity practices correspond to the risk management procedures described in
the Framework. 139 The Tiers cover a range that moves from a more informal and reactive
response, to responses that are adaptive and “risk-informed.” 140 The Tiers help “provide
context on how an organization views cybersecurity risk and the processes in place to
manage that risk.” 141 In order to determine the most appropriate Tier to mitigate risk and
feasibly meet organizational goals, each organization should consider their unique
constraints, objectives, threat environment, and legal or regulatory requirements. 142
The Framework Profiles are the outcomes that organizations select from the
Framework categories and subcategories based on their individual needs. 143 A Profile can
be particularly helpful in examining an organization’s current cybersecurity posture (i.e. “as
is”) and comparing it with a target Profile (i.e. hope “to be”). 144 This comparison can help
an organization identify steps that need to be taken to reach cybersecurity protection
goals. 145 Organizations can have multiple Profiles, each aligned with particular cyber
vulnerable business components and recognizing particular organizational needs. 146

133

Id.
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY
(2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework021214.pdf (last visited April 20, 2017).
135
Id. at 4.
136
Id. at 7, 19 (Figure 1 (p. 7) and Table 1 (p. 19)).
137 Id. at 8. “Subcategories further divide a Category into specific outcomes of technical and/or
management activities. They provide a set of results that, while not exhaustive, help support
achievement of the outcomes in each Category.”
138 Id.
139 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY
5
(2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework021214.pdf (last visited April 20, 2017).
140 Id. at 5, 10 (the Tier definitions are: Tier 1 (Partial), Tier 2 (Risk Informed), Tier 3 (Repeatable),
Tier 4 (Adaptive)).
141 Id. at 9.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 5.
144
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY
5
(2014),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework021214.pdf (last visited April 20, 2017).
145
Id. at 11.
146 Id.
134
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The NIST Framework is a good starting point to strengthen cybersecurity
programs. Additional standards developed collaboratively between the private sector and
government should be encouraged. These additional standards could build on this initial
Framework, adding to the depth and breadth of cybersecurity knowledge and showcasing
best practices and procedures. Such additional collaborative products would benefit both the
government and industry, helping maintain the security and resiliency of American critical
infrastructure. The maritime industry has recognized the importance of the NIST
Framework—all of the recently promulgated industry guidance cite the Framework and
suggest incorporating many of its recommended practices. 147
3.

United States Coast Guard Cyber Strategy

Partially due to Executive Order 13636, the United States Coast Guard
promulgated a Cyber Strategy in 2015. 148 This Strategy designates infrastructure protection
as one of the Coast Guard’s strategic priorities in the cyber domain. 149 It identifies two
goals and four strategies to help address cyber risks to maritime critical infrastructure. 150
Additionally, in 2013, the Coast Guard created a Cyber Command to coordinate its
cybersecurity efforts. 151
The first goal of the strategy is the promotion of cyber risk awareness and
management through risk assessment. 152 This goal has two objectives: 1) “Improve PortWide Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Tools and Methodologies,” and 2) “Improve
Cybersecurity Information Sharing.” 153 To achieve these objectives, the Coast Guard will
seek to leverage currently existing cybersecurity risk assessment tools, including those
currently employed by the Coast Guard, and those employed by other agencies and
industries. 154 It will also take steps to establish information sharing protocols and work with
industry partners and other government agencies to facilitate information sharing across
critical infrastructure sectors. 155

147

See supra Section III.
U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 19, at 5.
149 Id. at 31.
150 Id. at 32-33.
151 Id. at 7.
152
Id. at 32 (“The Coast Guard will incorporate cybersecurity into aspects of maritime operations in
order to reduce the risk . . . and to continue to protect the nation’s maritime critical infrastructure and
the American people.”).
153
U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 19, at 32.
154
Id.
155 Id.
148
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The second goal is aimed at prevention and seeks to “Reduce Cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities.” 156 This goal also has two objectives: 1) “Reduce Cyber Vulnerability for
Vessels and Facilities,” and 2) “Incorporate Cybersecurity into Training and Education
Requirements.” 157 These objectives target development of guidance and education by
working with industry partners, including international organizations, to determine best
practices and protocols. 158
C. Recent Cybersecurity Legislation
1.

2014 Cybersecurity Legislation

Prior to December 2014, no cybersecurity laws had been enacted since the
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. 159 In December 2014, however,
Congress approved five Acts related to cybersecurity. 160 The legislation most closely
related to critical infrastructure and marine transportation are the National Cybersecurity
Protection Act of 2014 and the Cybersecurity Enforcement Act of 2014.

156

Id. at 33 (“Understanding the vulnerabilities associated with cyber systems enables the Coast Guard
and the marine industry to take appropriate steps to reduce the risk to maritime cyber critical
infrastructure from attack, exploitation, failure, or misuse.”).
157 Id.
158
U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 19, at 33.
159 Lawrence J. Trautman, Article, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. &
Pol’y 341, 344 (2015).
160
Id. (these include the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, the Federal Information
Security Modernization Act of 2014, the Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act, the Homeland
Security Workforce Assessment Act, and the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014).
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a. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014
The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 amends the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, adding a provision for a National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center (NCCIC). 161 According to the Department of Homeland Security,
NCCIC “is a 24x7 cyber situational awareness, incident response, and management center
that is a national nexus of cyber and communications integration for the Federal
Government, intelligence community, and law enforcement.” 162 The mission of NCCIC is
to decrease the severity and likelihood of events that may cause considerable compromise to
the resilience and security of key national communications and information technology
networks. 163
A recent policy letter released by the Coast Guard regarding MTSA regulated
facilities and vessels allows certain cyber incidents to be reported to the NCCIC. 164 The
policy included cyber incidents in the definitions of reportable breaches of security and
suspicious activity. 165 It was also noted that “[p]lausible terrorist attack scenarios include
combined cyber and physical incidents.” 166 Once a cyber incident is reported, “the NCCIC
may be able to provide technical assistance to the porting party.” 167
In addition to establishing the NCCIC, the Cybersecurity Protection Act contains
a number of provisions addressing information sharing and required reports. 168
Furthermore, for the critical infrastructure sector, it requires the DHS under Secretary for
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity to “develop, regularly update, maintain,
and exercise adaptable cyber incident response plans to address cybersecurity risks . . . to
critical infrastructure.” 169 These plans are to be developed in coordination with appropriate
Federal, State, local, and industry partners. 170

161

Nat’l Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (2014).
National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/national-cybersecurity-and-communications-integration-center (last
visited Dec. 22, 2016).
163 Id.
164 U.S. Coast Guard, Policy Letter on Reporting Suspicious Activity & Breaches of Security (Dec. 14,
2016), https://homeport.uscg.mil (click on “Maritime Security” on the left menu bar and then “Policy.”
This letter is listed as “CG-5P Policy Ltr No. 08-16, Reporting Suspicious Activity & Breaches of
Security”) (Transportation Security Incidents are normally reported to the National Response Center.
However, “cyber incidents that do not also involve physical or pollution effects” may now be reported
“to the NCIC in lieu of the NRC . . . .”).
165
Id. at ¶ 3.A & B.
166 Id. at ¶ 2.D.
167
Id. at ¶ 3.C.iii.
168
Nat’l Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (2014).
169
Id. at § 7.
170 Id.
162
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b. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 is “An Act to provide for an
ongoing, voluntary public-private partnership to improve cybersecurity, and to strengthen
cybersecurity research and development, workforce development and education, and public
awareness and preparedness, and for other purposes.” 171 Title I of the Act amends the
National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 272), adding provisions that
strengthen public-private collaboration in the cybersecurity realm, including “on an ongoing
basis, facilitate and support the development of a voluntary, consensus-based, industry-led
set of standards . . . to cost-effectively reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure.” 172
Title II of the act focuses on cybersecurity research and development. 173 Among
other provisions, it directs the development of a federal cybersecurity research and
development strategic plan that is to be updated every four years and be “based on an
assessment of cybersecurity risk to guide the overall direction of Federal cybersecurity and
information assurance research and development . . . .” 174 While this strategic plan is to
guide Federal cybersecurity research, in developing and updating the plan, the government
entities are to work closely with the private sector, including academia, industry, and
interested stakeholders. 175 This will allow the government to solicit recommendations and
ensure that Federal research is not duplicating current private sector plans. 176
Title III of the Act involves education and workforce development. 177 This
portion of the Act promotes challenges and competitions to stimulate cybersecurity
innovation and learning. 178 It also codifies a scholarship-for-service program designed to
train and recruit promising individuals to fulfil cybersecurity positions at the tribal, local,
State, and Federal levels. 179 Title IV, Cybersecurity Awareness and Preparedness, involves
education. 180 Specifically, it orders the NIST Director, in consultation with other
appropriate agencies and stakeholders, “to coordinate a national cybersecurity awareness
and education program . . . .” 181
Title V, Advancement of Cybersecurity Technical Standards, directs NIST to
ensure coordination between agencies developing international technical information
system security standards, to develop a cloud computing strategy for the Federal
Government, and to support identity management research and development. 182 In the first
two tasks, NIST is explicitly directed to consult with “other relevant Federal agencies and
stakeholders from the private sector.” 183

171

Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (2014).
Id. at § 101(a).
173 Id. at § 201.
174 Id. at § 201(a)(1).
175 Id. at § 201(a)(2)(B).
176 Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 § 201(a)(2)(B)
(2014).
177 Id. at §§ 301-302.
178
Id. at § 301.
179 Id. at § 302.
180
Id. at § 401.
181
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 § 401(a). (2014).
182
Id. at §§ 501-504.
183 Id. at §§ 502-503.
172
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2. Cybersecurity Act of 2015 and Recent Presidential Policy
Information sharing has been one of the most consistently contentious issues
across the cyber domain. 184 Obstacles that have hindered information exchange include: the
concerns that shared information could be used as evidence of failing to meet a regulatory
standard, that after being shared with the government such information might be available
to the public through a public records request, and concern over individual privacy rights. 185
The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 seeks to “facilitate and promote” timely information sharing
across Federal and non-Federal entities to encourage sharing of information about cyber
threats. 186
a. Cybersecurity Act of 2015
The majority of the Cybersecurity Act is focused on information sharing. 187 It
requires the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security to develop procedures to
promote timely sharing of cyber information. 188 The Act also provides some key
protections to private sector entities that share cybersecurity information. 189 It exempts
information from disclosure via the Freedom of Information Act and requires that entities
sharing information remove material that identifies specific individuals. 190 Additionally, the
Act limits how federal, state, tribal, and local governments can use the information. 191 It
specifically states that information “shared with a State, tribal, or local government . . . shall
not be used . . . to regulate, including an enforcement action, the lawful activity of any nonFederal entity.” 192 The federal government may only use the information for a limited
number of purposes, including “a cybersecurity purpose,” 193 identifying cybersecurity
vulnerabilities or threats, or a purpose related to other specified threats. 194 Additionally, the
Act includes an entire section on “Protection from liability.” 195 Legal commentators have
suggested that such liability protection is a significant incentive to share information. 196 The
Act specifically states that “[n]o cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court
against any private entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed . . .” for information
shared in accordance with the Act. 197

184 Peter Carey et al., President Obama Signs Cybersecurity Act of 2015 to Encourage Cybersecurity
Information Sharing, NAT’L L. REV., (January 3, 2016).
185 Id.
186 6 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (2015).
187 Peter Carey et al., supra note 182.
188 6 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (2015).
189 Peter Carey et al., supra note 182.
190 6 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (2015).
191 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 1503, 1504 (2015).
192 6 U.S.C.A. § 1503(4)(C) (2015).
193 6 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (2015) (“The term ‘cybersecurity purpose’ means the purpose of protecting an
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system
from a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.”).
194 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(5)(A) (2015) (the other threats include death, serious bodily or economic harm,
terrorist acts, “a serious threat to a minor,” fraud or identify theft, espionage, or trade secret protection).
195
6 U.S.C.A. § 1505 (2015).
196
Peter Carey et al, supra note 182.
197 6 U.S.C.A. § 1505(a), (b) (2015).
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b. 2016 Presidential Policy
In February 2016, President Obama signed Executive Order 13718, creating a
Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity under the Department of Commerce. 198
The Commission was made up of twelve members and included former government
officials as well as representatives from academia and industry. 199 Executive Order 13718
directed the Commission to compile a report that included “detailed recommendations to
strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors . . . .” 200
The report was completed on December 1, 2016, and highlighted the critical need
for partnerships between the private and public sectors. 201 The report identified six “major
imperatives” which were further broken down into sixteen recommendations and fifty-three
action items. 202 The Commission felt “that most recommendations can and should begin in
the near term, with many meriting action within the first 100 days of the new
Administration.” 203 The aim of the report was to make recommendations for actions that
can be incorporated during the next decade to help increase cybersecurity in both the private
and public sectors. 204

198

Exec. Order No. 13718, 81 Fed. Reg. 29 (Feb. 9, 2016).
Comm’n on Enhancing Nat’l Cybersecurity, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/cybercommission (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
200 Exec. Order No. 13718, supra note 197 at § 3.
201 COMM’N ON ENHANCING NAT’L CYBERSECURITY, REPORT ON SECURING AND GROWING THE
DIGITAL
ECONOMY
(Dec.
1,
2016),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/02/cybersecurity-commission-report-finalpost.pdf.
202 Id. at 2 (“The imperatives are: 1. Protect, defend, and secure today’s information infrastructure and
digital networks. 2. Innovate and accelerate investment for the security and growth of digital networks
and the digital economy. 3. Prepare consumers to thrive in a digital age. 4. Build cybersecurity
workforce capabilities. 5. Better equip government to function effectively and securely in the digital
age. 6. Ensure an open, fair, competitive, and secure global digital economy.”).
203
Id.
204 Exec. Order No. 13718, supra note 196, § 3. R4.1
199
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The introduction to Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41), “United States
Cyber Incident Coordination,” notes that U.S. infrastructure “is vulnerable to malicious
activity, malfunction, human error, and acts of nature, placing the Nation and its people at
risk. Cyber incidents are a fact of contemporary life, and significant cyber incidents are
occurring with increasing frequency . . . .” 205 PPD-41 highlights the shared responsibility of
government, private sector, and individual stakeholders. 206 Further, it delineates principles
under which the Federal Government are to respond to cyber incidents (involving either
private sector or government entities). 207 For what the PPD termed “significant cyber
incidents,” 208 lead Federal agencies were designated “and an architecture for coordinating
the broader Federal Government response” was established. 209 PPD-41 mandated
coordinated and “concurrent lines of effort” by federal agencies. 210 The “concurrent lines of
effort” are divided into four areas of response, three undertaken for all cyber incidents, and
the fourth only when a federal government agency is the affected party. 211 The first three
areas are “threat response; asset response; and intelligence support and related activities.” 212
The final response area is “to manage the effects of the cyber incident on [the affected
federal agency’s] operations, customers, and workforce.” 213
Threat response is focused on investigation, collecting evidence and intelligence,
working to link related incidents, mitigation of any immediate threats, and other related
tasks. 214 Another goal is to “facilitat[e] information sharing and operational coordination
with asset response.” 215 Asset response provides technical assistance to the parties affected
by cyber incidents, to help them “protect their assets, mitigate vulnerabilities, and reduce
impacts of cyber incidents . . . .” 216 Additionally, this area of response looks beyond the
immediate threat vector to consider other entities and areas that may be vulnerable. 217 Asset
responders also assist by “providing guidance on how best to utilize Federal resources and
capabilities in a timely, effective manner to speed recovery.” 218 The threat and asset
response areas are designed to be closely related and enhance communications and
information sharing. 219 The intelligence support activity focuses on building situational
awareness, analyzing threats, identifying gaps, and gaining the ability to mitigate or degrade
adversarial threat capabilities. 220

205

Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41, supra note 73.
Id.
Id.
208 Id. § II.B (“Significant cyber incident. A cyber incident that is (or group of related cyber incidents
that together are) likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign
relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health
and safety of the American people.”).
209 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41 § I, supra note 73.
210 Id. § IV.
211 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41, supra note 73, § IV.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. § IV.A.
215
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41, supra note 73, § IV.B.
216 Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220 Id. at § IV.C. R4.1.
206
207
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When a federal agency is an affected party, efforts will be taken to manage the
effects of the incident. 221 This “line of effort” will be managed by the affected agency and
will include broad-ranging efforts, from external affairs to ensuring operational
continuity. 222 When a private entity is the affected party, the government will not play an
active role in managing the effects of the incident, “but it will remain cognizant of the
affected entity’s response activities . . . .” 223 For private sector entities, the most relevant
government agency will generally be responsible for maintaining this awareness. 224
Given the shared responsibility held by both the government and private sector, it
is also important for the private sector to cultivate situational awareness and develop threat
response procedures. Developing industry guidelines and procedures is an effective way to
share best practices and lessons learned. Such guidelines should be shared across company
lines and with the government so that all industry partners can benefit from the information.

221

Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41, supra note 73, § IV.D.
Id.
223
Id.
224 Id.
222

[231: 255]

MARINE CYBER SECURITY

255

III. MARITIME INDUSTRY PRACTICE AND GUIDANCE
The maritime industry has recently taken an increased notice of cyber risk. Three
industry-leading organizations promulgated guidance in 2016 alone. These guidelines and
suggestions highlight best practices and approaches to address maritime cyber risk
management. While differing in scope, some basic principles emerge that are consistent
throughout the guidelines. All three advocate integrating the NIST Framework principles
into the industry’s cyber approaches. Additionally, increasing cyber awareness was
recognized as a critical step in improving cybersecurity. While the American Bureau of
Shipping Guidance Notes are by far the most thorough, each of the industry guidelines
bring an important perspective to the table. These guidelines are important, not so much for
the techniques and procedures they discuss, but for the fact that these highly influential
maritime organizations are taking notice of the cyber threat and working to increase
industry awareness.
A. Baltic and International Maritime Council: The Guidelines on Cyber
Security Onboard Ships
“The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships,” released by the Baltic and
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and several other influential maritime
associations, is tailored to ship-owners and operators. 225 The Guidelines are designed to
give pointers on assessing operations and implementing the necessary actions and
procedures to maintain cybersecurity aboard ships. 226 The “Guidelines focus on the unique
issues facing the shipping industry onboard ships.” 227 Additionally, the Guidelines aim to
improve awareness and understanding of good cybersecurity practices. 228

225

BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS 1 (Version
1.1,
2016),
https://www.marad.dot.gov/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/Guidelines_on_cyber_security_onboard_ships_version_1-1_Feb2016.pdf.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228 Id.
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The Guidelines set out a framework for cybersecurity awareness that includes six
related steps: identify threats; identify vulnerabilities; assess risk exposure; develop
protection and detection measures; establish contingency plans; and respond to cyber
security incidents. 229 To identify threats, a ship owner or operator must understand both the
external and internal 230 threat possibilities. 231 While cyber risk is pervasive, each maritime
entity needs to identify the specific risks to their operation, company, trade, or vessel. 232 In
identifying vulnerabilities, companies need to cultivate awareness “of any specific aspect of
their operations that might increase their vulnerability to cyber incidents.” 233 Additionally,
the Guidelines point out that each entity must have knowledge and understanding of any
protection measures already in place and the capabilities and limitations of these
measures. 234
In assessing risk exposure, the Guidelines specify that any cyber protections
already in place, along with the specific vulnerabilities that are found in the maritime
industry, should be considered. 235 The maritime realm presents a number of features that are
potentially vulnerable to cyber threats. “Multiple stakeholders are often involved in the
operation and chartering of a ship potentially resulting in lack of accountability for the IT
infrastructure.” 236 Additionally, ships regularly “interface[] with other parts of the global
supply chain . . . [and share information] with shore-based service providers.” 237
Furthermore, many ship systems, including those related to environmental protection and
safety, are controlled by computers. 238 The Guidelines suggest using the NIST framework
to assess current approaches and help identify risks. 239 It is additionally suggested that each
company should conduct an internal risk assessment to identify potential threats and survey
current systems and procedures. 240 This self-assessment should be followed up by a thirdparty assessment to find any additional threat vectors missed during the self-assessment. 241

229

Id. at 2.
Id.
231 BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS 1 (Version
1.1,
2016),
https://www.marad.dot.gov/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/Guidelines_on_cyber_security_onboard_ships_version_1-1_Feb2016.pdf. (Internal
threat possibilities are caused by insufficient awareness or inappropriate use).
232 Id. at 3.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 2.
235 Id. at 6.
236 Id.
237 BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS 1 (Version
1.1,
2016),
https://www.marad.dot.gov/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/Guidelines_on_cyber_security_onboard_ships_version_1-1_Feb2016.pdf.
at 6.
238 Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
at 7.
241 Id. at 10.
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Reducing risk through the development of protection and detection measures is
one of the most important steps in the cybersecurity awareness cycle. The Guidelines
suggest implementing a layered approach that focuses on both technical and procedural
defenses. 242 Technical defenses are “focused on ensuring that onboard systems are designed
and configured to be resilient to cyber-attacks.” 243 Procedural defenses ensure that company
policies, procedures (both safety and security), and access controls cover cyber
vulnerabilities. 244 One critical procedural control identified by the Guidelines is ensuring
adequate training and awareness of personnel who operate and support the ship. 245
Each company should establish “appropriate contingency plans in order to
effectively respond to cyber incidents.” 246 These plans should be periodically tested so that
personnel are familiar with the appropriate procedures to follow in the case of a cyber
incident. 247 The Guidelines further suggest that these plans should be available in some type
of non-electronic form in case the cyber incident involves deleting or disrupting access to
data. 248
According to the Guidelines, the final step, “respond to cyber security incidents,”
should be informed by all the previous steps in the awareness cycle. 249 Furthermore, the
plans that were developed should be implemented, and their effectiveness measured. 250 The
Guidelines also specify that vulnerabilities and threats should be re-evaluated in light of the
actual incident. 251

242

Id. at 12.
BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS 1 (Version
1.1,
2016),
https://www.marad.dot.gov/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/Guidelines_on_cyber_security_onboard_ships_version_1-1_Feb2016.pdf.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 15.
246 Id. at 18.
247 Id.
248
Id.
249 BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS 1 (Version
1.1,
2016),
https://www.marad.dot.gov/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/Guidelines_on_cyber_security_onboard_ships_version_1-1_Feb2016.pdf.
250
Id.
251 Id.
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B. International Maritime Organization: Interim Guidelines on Maritime
Cyber Risk Management
The Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) approved and published “Interim Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management”
in June 2016. 252 The Committee’s reason for releasing the Guidelines was “the urgent need
to raise awareness on cyber risk threats and vulnerabilities.” 253 This short document gives a
broad overview of items to consider related to cyber risk and references both the NIST
Framework and the BIMCO Guidelines. 254 The IMO Guidelines focus on a risk
management approach and are designed to be incorporated with existing industry processes
and procedures. 255
The Guidelines advocate creating a culture of cyber risk awareness that starts at
the most senior level of management and flows throughout every level of an
organization. 256 In order to create and sustain this culture of risk awareness, the Guidelines
focus on the same five functional elements identified in the NIST framework: identify,
protect, detect, respond, and recover. 257 The Guidelines note that the “functional elements
are not sequential—all should be concurrent and continuous in practice and should be
incorporated appropriately in a risk management framework.” 258
The “identify” element contains a suggestion that all personnel responsibilities
and roles related to cybersecurity should be identified. 259 Additionally, any critical data,
capabilities, assets or systems that are potential vulnerable to cyber-attack should also be
identified. 260 Under “protect,” IMO advocates implementing risk control measures and
processes that focus on protecting against a potential cyber event, and aim to ensure
operational continuity in the face of such an event. 261 The “detect,” “respond,” and
“recover” elements focus on developing and implementing processes that effectively allow
organizations to detect a cyber event, and respond in such a way that allows for timely
restoral and recovery of critical systems. 262

252

INT’L MAR. ORG., INTERIM GUIDELINES ON MARITIME CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT, MSC.1/CIRC.
1526
(2016),
https://www.marad.dot.gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/MSC.1-Circ.1526-InterimGuidelines-On-Maritime-Cyber-Risk-Management-....pdf.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 4.
255 Id. at 1.
256 Id. at 3.
257
Id.
258 INT’L MAR. ORG., supra note 250 at 3.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262 Id.
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C. American Bureau of Shipping CyberSafety™ Guidance Notes
In 2016, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) 263 released a series of five
volumes of CyberSafety™ Guidance Notes. This series is by far the most detailed guidance
available for maritime cybersecurity. In the Foreword to the second volume of the series,
ABS notes that “[e]xposure to these [cyber] threats has become pervasive due to the
exponential growth of automation methods—and increasingly, autonomy—that has
penetrated nearly all aspects of shipboard and offshore asset systems.” 264 ABS points out
that since such systems are integral to multiple facets of platform, ship, or asset operations,
they are critical to operational safety and security. 265
Volume 1: Cybersecurity, published in February 2016, offers cybersecurity
commentary and best practices. 266 Cyber awareness should be “a foundational element of
overall safety and security within and across the marine and offshore communities.” 267 The
volume is divided into five sections. The first two sections are more general in nature,
discussing cybersecurity and giving advice on developing a cybersecurity program. The last
three sections gather best practices that apply to marine and offshore operations. In
discussing best practices, ABS advocates have developed nine basic capabilities as the
foundation of a successful cybersecurity program. 268 Once the baseline capabilities are
established, additional capabilities should be developed to provide increasing breadth and
depth to a cybersecurity program. 269

263

ABS is an internationally recognized classification society. A classification society is “an
organization that develops official standards for the shipping industry and checks the condition of ships
and their equipment to make certain they are safe and meet the official standards of the shipping
industry.”
Classification
Society,
CAMBRIDGE
BUSINESS
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/classification-society (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
264 American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for: Cybersecurity Implementation for the Marine and
Offshore Industries, 2 ABS CYBERSAFETY™ ii (2016), http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rulesand-guides/current/other/251_cybersafetyV2/CyberSafety_V2_Cybersecurity_Guide_e.pdf.
265 Id.
266 American Bureau of Shipping, Guidance Notes on: the Application of Cybersecurity Principles to
Marine
And
Offshore
Operations,
1
ABS
CYBERSAFETY™
ii
(2016),
http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-andguides/current/other/250_cybersafetyV1/CyberSafety_V1_Cybersecurity_GN_e.pdf.
267
Id. at ii.
268 Id. at Fig. 1 (the basic capabilities are: “1-Exercise Best Practices; 2-Build the Security
Organization; 3-Provision for Employee Awareness & Training; 4-Perform Risk Assessment; 5Provide Perimeter Defense; 6-Prepare for Incident Response & Recovery; 7-Provide Physical Security;
8-Execute Access Management; and 9-Maintain Asset Management”).
269 Id. at 5.

260

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

[231: 260]

Volume 2, published in September 2016, 270 establishes criteria to assess the
readiness of assets and systems to prevent cyber incidents that could compromise the
security and/or safety of assets, systems, and critical data. 271 This volume, referred to as a
Guide, “provides a model for implementing cybersecurity programs.” 272 A ship under the
classification purview of ABS that complies with the criteria and procedures identified in
the Guide can be issued a “CyberSafety Management System Certificate (CMSC) and
Notation . . . .” 273 Additionally, a facility can be issued a “Certificate of Cyber Compliance
(CCC).” 274 The Guide lays out detailed procedures and processes for obtaining and
maintaining certification. 275
Volume 3 is specifically focused on “data integrity.” 276 This particular Guidance
Note “is intended to help the industry realize the new benefits from data sources and data
analytics systems via implementation of Data Integrity concepts.” 277 The Note focuses on
three main areas: characterizing data, securing data, and maintaining data integrity. 278

270

Volumes 2–5 were all published in September 2016.
See American Bureau of Shipping, supra note 263 at ii.
272 Id. at 1.
273 Id. (Vessels or “offshore assets not classed by ABS can be issued a ‘Statement of Fact’ when they
are in conformance with the requirements of this Guide.”).
274 Id.
275
Id. at 2–4.
276 American Bureau of Shipping, Guidance Notes on: Data Integrity for Marine and Offshore
Operations, 3 ABS CYBERSAFETY™ ii (2016), http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-andguides/current/other/252_cybersafetyV3/CyberSafety_V3_Data_Integrity_GN_e.pdf.
277
Id.
278 Id. at 3.
271
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Volume 4, the Guide for Software Systems Verification, is focused on the
software component of the control systems found onboard vessels (and offshore assets). 279
“The objective of this Guide is to reduce software-related incidents that could negatively
affect the security, safety and performance of [computer-based control] systems.” 280 The
Guide presents various criteria and processes designed to verify the software portion of
vessel control systems. 281 ABS suggests that the “verification and validation organization”
(used to perform software verification) should be a completely independent third-party. 282
Systems identified as of particular note include dynamic positioning, power management,
thruster control, and blowout prevention. 283 This Guide focuses exclusively on software and
does not provide procedures to verify hardware. 284 A vessel that conforms to the criteria and
procedures outlined in the Guide may be granted an “SSV” notation to indicate
compliance. 285
Volume 5 is designed to augment ABS’s Guide for Integrated Software Quality
Management (ISQM). 286 The ISQM “presents a risk-based software development and
maintenance process . . . based upon internationally recognized standards.” 287 This volume
is designed mainly for software system providers involved in software design and quality
assurance. 288

279

American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for: Software Systems Verification, 4 ABS CYBERSAFETY™ ii
(2016),
http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-andguides/current/other/253_cybersafetyV4/CyberSafety_V4_SSV_Guide_e.pdf.
280 Id. at 1.
281 Id. at 6.
282 Id. at 3. Id. at 3. A Verification and Validation Organization (V&V) is “[t]he organization that
develops the verification plan and performs the software verification of the control system.” The V&V
must be an independent third party unless “special consideration” is requested from ABS and ABS
determines that “sufficient independence” exists between the V&V and the system provider of the
software being verified.
283 Id. at 13–14; Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Servicing eTool:
Drilling—Blowout
Preventers,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/drilling/wellcontrol_bop.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2017)
(a blowout preventer is designed to prevent blowout from occurring on an oil or gas well by “shut[ting]
off the well hole and prevent[ing] the escape of the underground fluids”).
284 4 AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, supra note 278 at 8.
285
Id. at 1.
286 5 AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, ABS CYBERSAFETY™ GUIDANCE NOTES ON SOFTWARE
PROVIDER CONFORMITY PROGRAM ii (2016), http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-andguides/current/other/254_cybersafetyV5/CyberSafety_V5_SPCP_GN_e.pdf.
287
Id.
288 Id. at 1.
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The ABS standards are by far the most detailed and thorough currently available
in the maritime domain. ABS, as a classification society, carries great weight in the
maritime industry. “In the absence of classification societies for ships, there would be no
benchmark or guideline standards for vessels and other constructions to adhere to.” 289
Thus, the ABS CyberSafety™ Guidance Notes are a big step forward for the cybersecurity
practices of the maritime industry and should be used as a template for future industry
tactics, techniques, and procedures. Wide adoption of the ABS standards and creation of
similar standards by other classification societies will allow the maritime industry to vastly
improve cybersecurity awareness and preparation, effectively reducing cyber
vulnerabilities.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recently the U.S. government and the maritime industry have made good strides
towards addressing cybersecurity issues in the maritime domain. However, while a good
foundation currently exists, the industry and government need to continue to build on that
foundation. The next steps include creating a pervasive culture of cyber risk awareness,
ensuring that to the extent possible, MTSA required security plans address cyber risk, and
revising current regulations or developing new regulations to focus on cybersecurity.
A.

Create a Culture of Cyber Risk Awareness

All components of the marine transportation sector—government, port facilities,
ship owners and operators, and other related entities—need to create a culture of cyber risk
awareness. This culture needs to be supported by the highest levels of management and
continue down through all personnel who access systems vulnerable to cyber-attack.
Indeed, the BIMCO Guidelines specifically state that “[c]yber security should start at the
senior management level of a company . . . .” 290 The key to implementing such a culture is
educating personnel on cyber vulnerabilities and types of threats. All of the materials
reviewed for this Note advocated the creation of a total organizational culture that promoted
cyber risk awareness. Until this type of culture is in place, and robust cyber awareness
training and education is the norm, each organization is only as safe as its least educated
employee with access to critical systems.
B.

Ensure MTSA Required Plans Address Cyber Risk

The requirements promulgated under MTSA for area maritime, facility, and
vessel security plans can be considered to include cyber elements through the
communications and security systems section. 291 In creating, updating, and evaluating
vessel and facility security plans, emphasis should be placed on ensuring that cyber
vulnerabilities are considered and addressed. The Coast Guard and AMS Committees
should make addressing cyber risk a top priority.
289

Sharda, The Importance of Classification Societies in the Maritime Industry, MARINE INSIGHT (July
21, 2016), http://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/the-importance-of-classification-societies-inthe-maritime-industry/.
290
BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, supra note 249 at 6.
291 33 C.F.R. §§ 103.405, 104.405, 105.405 (2016).
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The NIST Framework is a useful tool for companies and organizations to use in
evaluating current approaches to cybersecurity. The Coast Guard, AMS Committees,
classification societies, and maritime organizations should encourage use of the Framework
when addressing cyber risk. The procedures put in place based on NIST Tiers and Profiles
should be included in all MTSA required plans.
Once MTSA required plans include cyber elements, the planned response to
cyber-attacks should be regularly tested through drills and exercises. This will help ensure
that employees and regulators are familiar with the policies and procedures set forth in the
plans. It will also help identify any gaps in the plans. Identifying gaps in an environment
where the risk is simulated and failure does not cause irreparable damage is preferable to
discovering gaps during an actual attack. Furthermore, it will allow individuals who have
been identified in the plans as having decision-making authority to practice making
decisions related to cyber-attacks.
The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) should continue to emphasize
cybersecurity as a critical priority. This funding opportunity can assist maritime companies
and port stakeholders in paying for third-party assessments, or gaining equipment needed to
close cyber vulnerabilities identified in such assessments. 292 However, FEMA should
ensure appropriate standards are promulgated for review of cyber projects under the PSGP.
These standards should include provisions to allow both field and national level reviewers
to consult with appropriate cyber experts during the review process.
C.

Develop Additional Maritime Focused Cybersecurity Legislation

While MTSA can be read to include cyber, it would be better to either pass
legislation that amended MTSA to explicitly include cybersecurity, or create new
legislation specifically focused on cybersecurity in the maritime sector. Legislation
designed to revise and amend MTSA would clearly signal that cyber threats and
vulnerabilities are an important part of the security of United States seaports and vessels.
Even MTSA was an amendment to an earlier act (the Merchant Marine Act of 1936). 293
Any revision of MTSA should update the definition of a transportation security incident to
clearly include cyber-related disruptions. 294 Additionally, any revision of MTSA (or new
legislation) should include a requirement for vessels and facilities to create, test, and
maintain plans to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and responses to cyber-attacks.
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See e.g. DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Address Port Cybersecurity, supra note 92 at 9.
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
294 See U.S. Coast Guard, supra note 163.
293
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2014 and 2015 saw a significant increase in cybersecurity legislation. 295
However, many additional governmental cybersecurity polices were promulgated by
Executive Order and Presidential Policy Directive. With a major change in administration
occurring in January 2016, it is unknown how many of these policies and procedures will
remain in effect or what focus the new administration will have on cybersecurity. 296 This
uncertainty highlights the need for the creation of additional, durable cybersecurity
legislation. The policies enacted through Executive Order and Presidential Policy Directive
should be considered for inclusion in new or revised legislation. This way, the best and
most effective of the practices identified in these presidential orders can be codified into
legislation. This will allow such policies to endure even in the face of presidential
transition.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern ships, facilities, and ports rely on integrated systems that are vulnerable
to cyber-attacks. Thankfully, a major cyber-attack on the marine transportation sector has
not yet occurred. However, significant manmade disruptions have shown the far-reaching
effects such events could have on the prosperity and security of the United States. 297 The
capabilities of cyber-terrorists are continuing to grow and develop, presenting increased
risks to the industrial control systems employed by the maritime industry. Both the
maritime industry and the federal government have begun to address the cyber threat in the
maritime domain. However, both the industry and government need to continue building on
this foundation and harden marine transportation against cyber threats. It is critical for all
maritime partners to implement a culture of cyber risk awareness. This culture must be
pervasive, reaching from the highest levels of management to the workers at the most junior
levels. Additionally, the government should work with industry to share information,
leverage current regulations to their full extent, and create new regulations that specifically
focus on cybersecurity. Only through continuous vigilance and a willingness to share
information will the marine transportation sector be able to protect its critical intellectual
property and keep ports, facilities, and vessels safe from cyber threats.
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See supra Part II.C. Prior to 2014 no significant cybersecurity legislation had been enacted since
2002, however, in 2014 five Acts were approved and another major Act was passed in 2015.
Joseph J. Lazzarotti, President Donald J. Trump—What Lies Ahead for Privacy, Cybersecurity, eCommunication?, 11/9/16 NAT’L L. REV., 2016 WLNR 34340881 (2016).
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